

MAXIM LITVINOV

The Russian typescript here presented in an English translation purports to consist of notes dictated by Maxim Litvinov, partly from memory and partly from manuscript notes which he afterwards destroyed; it covers, with many gaps and interruptions, the period from 1926 to 1939; and there are a few brief and isolated entries for later years down to 1950. At the request of the publishers I have attempted to investigate the origin of the document with a view to ascertain whether, and how far, it is likely to be genuine. The paucity of authentic information about everything that has gone on behind the scenes in the Soviet Union since 1928, and the appetite in foreign countries for such information, has led to the publication in recent years of a number of memoirs written, or purporting to be written by witnesses of these events or participants in them. These books have been of a variable, and sometimes highly dubious, character. Some have been unquestionably genuine, though the strong prejudices of the authors, or the desire to produce sensational stories, may detract from their value as first-hand evidence. Others appear to be simple forgeries, inspired either by political or by commercial motives. Others - perhaps the most numerous class - have a genuine substratum of fact, but have been written up or 'ghosted' by journalists or professional writers, who, in putting them

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into literary form to give them a popular appeal, have overlaid the facts with an enormous superstructure of fiction, thus offering an apparently insoluble puzzle to those anxious to extract the grains of truth which they contain. It is against this background that the Litvinov journal, the most sensational work of its kind yet published (to whichever of these categories it may belong), must be considered.

When the first part of the typescript (down to the year 1936) was submitted to me last year, I visited Paris whence it had reached London, in an attempt to obtain detailed and accurate information about its provenance. According to statements made to me in the course of my investigations, the main entries were dictated by Litvinov in the later 1930's or early 1940's from notes made earlier by Litvinov himself in a personal cypher or an illegible handwriting. The greater part of them were dictated, apparently at different times and places, abroad; and the typescript was deposited in two copies with Madame Alexandra Kollontai, the Soviet Minister in Stockholm and a trusted friend of Litvinov. Only the concluding sections were dictated by Litvinov in the Soviet Union after his return from Washington in 1943. These were also handed to Madame Kollontai, then on a visit to Moscow from Stockholm. But when she read these sections, she found parts of them

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so compromising that she was afraid to take the risk of carrying them across the frontier. These parts she destroyed; and this was said to account for the fact that the sections for the middle 1930's are much briefer and less informative than the earlier sections. When Madame Kollontai finally left Stockholm for Moscow on her retirement in March 1945, she left the document in the custody of another person with the injunction that nothing should be published till after Litvinov's death. Litvinov died in January 1952, Madame Kollontai in March 1952.

The supposition that the journal consists of material dictated some years after the events described from notes made at the time, and not revised by the author, may explain some of its peculiar characteristics. A few of the items carry a specific date and read like entries in a diary; most of them have no other heading except that of the year to which they belong. Litvinov is said to have dictated hurriedly and nervously, frequently interrupting himself and abruptly changing the subject, sometimes instructing the secretary to leave a gap with the intention of returning and filling it later. These deliberate gaps are marked in the text by the word 'omission', other interruptions in the sequence of thought by dots.

The above account of the origin of the document was given to me, in part orally, in part in writing, by Russian

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intermediaries through whose hands the documents passed, and whom I interviewed in Paris. Answers have been furnished in writing to further questions put by me. But I have been unable to interview either the person to whom the notes are said to have been dictated by Litvinov or the person to whom the document was entrusted by Madame Kollontai when she left Stockholm (who is himself said to have died since). In these circumstances, it has been impossible for me to establish the genuineness of the document, or the authenticity of the account given to me of its origin. The problem was further complicated after my return to London by the receipt of another instalment of the typescript which had not been previously available - the whole section from 1937 onwards. This section, like the later part of the original typescript was markedly inferior in interest to the earlier sections, and contained at least one gross error of fact such as could hardly have been committed by Litvinov himself. No explanation was forthcoming of the origin of this later section or of the reasons for its omission from the original typescript.

External evidence failing, the issue of the character of the document must turn mainly on the uncertain ground of internal evidence. The hypothesis of a complete forgery or fiction cannot be dismissed out of hand. If this hypothesis is correct, the motive has been commercial, not political. Which particular statements in the journal may

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be regarded as favourable or hostile to the regime, the document as a whole serves no apparent propaganda purpose; the author appears as in many respects ambivalent in his judgments on the events described, and, in particular, in his attitude to Stalin. This gives the document, whether genuine or not, a certain value for the historian. If it is a fiction, it is a fiction written without parti pris, and much of it written by someone intimately concerned with party and with diplomatic events; many passages betray close and detailed knowledge which can be checked from other sources. That it is not marked by any depth of thought, that it contains many trivialities, some improbabilities, and some demonstrable inaccuracies, that it exhibits a strong tendency to 'show off' and, considering the position of the supposed author, an extraordinary degree of independence, does not necessarily constitute an argument against its genuineness. A few days after Litvinov's death the Washington Post in its issues of January 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th 1952, published an interview stated to have been given by Litvinov to an American correspondent in Moscow, Robert Hottelet, in July 1946 shortly before his retirement. In this interview Litvinov was strongly critical of the foreign policy then being pursued by the Soviet Government, and expressed anxiety about a possible clash with the Western Powers. Litvinov is said to have made no specific

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request that his remarks should be regarded as 'off the record', but it seemed obvious that their publication during his life time would have been highly damaging to him. The remarks attributed to him certainly displayed great boldness, not to say recklessness; something of this quality is required to explain a readiness to record in writing, even outside Russia, some of the entries in the journal. The authenticity of the Hottel interview has not been called in question; and, if this is placed beside some of the passages in the present document, a marked similarity of tone and attitude can be detected. The conspicuous incoherence of the document, and the abrupt changes of subject, mood and style, are perhaps an argument in its favour. Whatever its origin, it cannot, I think, be doubted that a large part of it fairly represents Litvinov's outlook and standpoint during this period.

To disentangle the hypothetical substratum of fact from superstructure of fiction is, however, a difficult task. Certain passages suggesting foreknowledge of later events (e.g. the reference to Bukharin on page ... and several references to Soviet-German relations hinting at the denouement of 1941) would be easily explicable if one assumed that the former passage was in fact dictated after 1938 and the latter after 1941. On the other hand, any passages which

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could be proved to reflect knowledge of events occurring in or after 1945 would be conclusive evidence of a fake.

The most spectacular passage from this point of view occurs on page, where Mao Tse-tung appears in Moscow in May 1926 as a delegate of the Chinese Communist party, plays a prominent part in the discussion of policy with the Russian leaders, and is described as 'shrewd as a Hunan fox' and more than a match for Stalin in craftiness. Mao Tse-tung appears to have been a member of the Chinese Communist Party since its foundation in 1921; but he is not generally supposed to have played any noteworthy part in its affairs before 1927. Yet a quasi-official biography of Chiang Kai-shek shows that, during the period of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance, Mao was sufficiently important to be placed at the head of the publicity or propaganda department of Kuomintang, and that he was dismissed from this post in this very month of May 1926 as part of a drive against the Communists and the Russian advisers following the incident of March 1926 (S.I. Hsiung, The Life of Chiang Kai-shek (1948), pp.247-248.) There is nothing in the wording of the passage in the journal to suggest that it has been fabricated for any political motive, e.g. in order to show that Mao was from the first a faithful disciple of Moscow; and the remainder of the account of the discussions in the Russian party has an authentic ring. The most that can be

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said is that an otherwise unrecorded visit of Mao Tse-tung to Moscow seems in itself improbable, and that the tone of the passage strongly suggests that it was written subsequently to Mao's rise to power. This passage is the most puzzling conundrum in the document; and a study of it and other passages relating to China by Chinese experts might throw important light on the problem of its authenticity.

Another passage which prima facie excites suspicion is that recounting an alleged offer made by Benes to a Soviet agent in Prague in 1920 to cede Sub-Carpathian Russia Soviet Russia. This reads at first sight like an ex post facto attempt to justify the cession of 1945. Unfortunately for this theory, the story already appears in a rather less detailed form in G. Bessedovsky's, Na Putyakh k Terpidoru, published in Paris 1931, when no such motive can be imagined. It is not in itself improbable that in the summer of 1920, when Benes, in common with other European politicians, expected the imminent fall of Warsaw and the Sovietization of Poland, he should have been willing to purchase Soviet good will by the cession of a territory which, from the Czech point of view, was always a white elephant. The account, whether or not it emanates personally from Litvinov, seems likely to be true. Other passages, notably the conversation with Trotsky and Joffe in 1926 with which the journal opens, and the conversation with Kamenev in 1928, show an intimate knowledge of party affairs; and the account,

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of Litvinov's personal relations with Stalin, and such details as his jealousy of Maisky's greater success in western diplomatic society, are, to say the least, plausible and revealing.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that numerous and extensive passages bear the mark of having been re-touched or invented for the supposed purpose of giving the document a popular appeal; and the tone and style of some of these differs so noticeably from that of the more serious material referred to above that, whatever other conclusions may be formed, it is difficult to avoid the hypothesis that at least two hands have been at work on the document. Broadly speaking, the more serious passages, whether they are to be ascribed to Litvinov or to some other well-informed participant in public affairs, predominate in the earlier sections; in the later sections the hand of the gossip-writer becomes gradually more and more prominent, and in the last sections of all appears to take exclusive possession. The increasing interest in recounting petty personal scandals, the farcical account of events in the Paris Embassy in 1930, the references to an alleged Russian proclivity for stealing watches (reflecting gossip current all over Europe in 1945) and, finally, the emptiness and triviality of the entries from 1937 onwards seem to be characteristic products of this second hand.

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It is this last section which contains the gross error of misdating the trial and execution of Tukhachevsky and his fellow generals by one year (it is placed not in 1937, but in 1938, after the trial of Bukharin, Krestinsky and Rakovsky) - an error which could not possibly have been made by the competent and well-informed writer (whether Litvinov himself or some literary 'ghost') responsible for many of the earlier sections of the document.

In the course of time further evidence may be found which will explain the origin and character of this strange - and, if my hypothesis is correct - composite document; or it may long remain a puzzle for the historical detective. My present belief is that it contains a substratum of genuine material emanating in some form or other from Litvinov himself. But parts of it are certainly accretions added later by another hand or hands; and, while some of the accretions may be the authentic recollections of someone closely associated with Litvinov, others appear to be pure fiction. These uncertainties do not, however, deprive it of its value as a picture of an outstanding figure in the Soviet foreign relations of the period. Even considered as a historical romance, it would be a work of considerable insight and imagination as well as of a high degree of literary talent.

Maxim Maximovich Litvinov (his original name was Meier Moiseevich Wallach) was born in Belostock, a predominantly Jewish town on the borders of Russia and Russian Poland, in 1876. His early career was much like that of the other young revolutionaries of the period. He joined a cell of the still largely unorganized Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in Kiev, was arrested and served a term of imprisonment, and fled abroad in 1902. He quickly became a faithful follower of Lenin and a good Bolshevik. Returning to Russia, he worked as a party organizer in Riga and engaged in various forms of underground work, including the smuggling of arms into Russia. In January 1908 he was arrested in Paris as a receiver of bank notes stolen from the Russian State Bank in the famous 'Tiflis expropriation' of June 1907, with which Stalin was directly concerned. Litvinov was, however, neither brought to trial in Paris nor extradited to Russia, but simply deported. He went to London, where he worked as a publisher's clerk and became the principal Bolshevik agent. In 1916 he married Ivy Low, the niece of the well-known journalist and publicist Sidney Low; their two children were born in London in 1917 and 1918.

Litvinov's career up to this point was a clear indication of his value to the party and of the kind of role he could play in it. He was not a thinker, and

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never attempted either to make any contribution to party theory or even - like Stalin - to write popular pamphlets or articles on Marxism. He displayed no interest in party controversies or dissensions: having become a Bolshevik he was content to follow Lenin without scruple or question. He was an enterprising and energetic manager and organizer, who could be relied on to carry out efficiently any job assigned to him; and having travelled all over Europe on party affairs, he had an extensive practical knowledge of the principal European countries and languages. His association with the 'Tiflis expropriation' proved a significant episode. At the party congress in London in the summer of 1907, which was attended by Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the 'expropriations' were a subject of acute controversy and criticism; in the end the congress condemned the expropriations, and appointed a party commission to enquire into them under the presidency of Chicherin, then a Menshevik. The recollection of this affair was a lasting bond between Litvinov and Stalin, and a source of their common antipathy for Chicherin.

One of the first acts of the newly established Soviet Government in November 1917 was to appoint Litvinov as its representative (unrecognized, of course, by the British Government) in London; and one of Litvinov's first

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tasks was to negotiate the release of Chicherin from Brixton prison and his return to Russia. Litvinov was arrested and expelled from Great Britain in September 1918 as a reprisal for the similar treatment of Lockhart, the British Agent in Moscow. He was appointed a member of the collegium of Narkomindel (the People's Commissariat of Foreign affairs), and later Deputy Commissar under Chicherin. From 1926 onwards, when Chicherin's health began to fail, he was in effective control of Narkomindel, though he only received the substantive appointment on Chicherin's retirement in 1930. In his later years Litvinov was as faithful a follower of Stalin as he had formerly been of Lenin. As a westerner, he was sometimes outraged, as the journal shows, by the ruthlessness of Stalin's methods. But the shock did not destroy either his admiration or his affection and never seems to have placed a serious strain on his loyalty. Each of the two men had a curiously unshaken confidence that the other would not turn against him. The journal often expresses disagreement with Stalin on concrete issues, especially in regard to Germany. But Litvinov, like Stalin, was a thorough-going empiricist and disagreement between them never turned on grounds of principle. Hence reconciliation was easy when the policy changed. Litvinov

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was People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1930 till May 1939, when he was dramatically replaced by Molotov. After a long eclipse throughout the period of the Soviet-German alliance he re-emerged after Hitler's attack on Russia to become Soviet Ambassador in Washington, where he arrived in December 1941 on the eve of Pearl Harbour. He was recalled to Moscow in 1943, and was then one of several Deputy Commissars for Foreign Affairs under Molotov till his final retirement in August, 1946. He died in Moscow in January, 1952, at the age of 75.

Throughout nearly the whole period covered by the journal Litvinov was thus the effective head of Narkomindel, though Chicherin remained its nominal head till 1930. The main subject of the journal is foreign policy, and in this field three topics constantly recur.

The first is the organization of the conduct of foreign affairs. It was well known from other sources that major decisions of foreign policy were taken at informal meetings of party leaders or in the Politburo (here called the Instantsiya), to which the head of Narkomindel was commonly summoned for the purpose of the discussion, sometimes accompanied by senior officials of the commissariat: this appears in the journal as the regular

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procedure. Disputes between Narkomindel and the foreign department (INO) of the GPU (the 'near neighbours') or the military intelligence (the 'far neighbours') are a frequent theme; both these departments had their agents (or 'residents') attached to all Soviet diplomatic missions abroad. Complaints are sometimes made of decisions taken by Stalin, over the head of Narkomindel, or even without its knowledge, on the strength of reports from the intelligence departments and carried out through those departments. All this is plausible enough: friction between the diplomatic service and the secret service and between the head of the government and the minister in charge of foreign affairs are common phenomena in most countries. Numerous passages in the journal relating to petty scandals in embassies are not in themselves incredible, but show obvious signs of having been written up for popular consumption.

The second topic which receives a great deal of attention is Soviet policy in the Far East. Apart from Mao Tse-tung's highly dubious appearance in Moscow in 1926, there is nothing in the account of Far Eastern affairs which contradicts commonly accepted views, and much light is thrown on the details of policy and on

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divisions of opinion between Soviet leaders. The effect of the document, if we accept its evidence, is to put back to the spring of 1926 the dissensions between the Russian party leaders about Chinese policy which came to a head in 1927. The alleged discussion in the Politburo on 'the third Saturday in May' 1926 turned on an incident in Canton on March 18th-20th of that year, when Chinese communists, apparently with the connivance of the Russian advisers to the Kuomintang Government, attempted a coup against Chiang Kai-Shek by seizing the gunboat Chung Shan (here erroneously called Sun Yat-sen - probably a confused recollection of the fact that Sun Yat-sen took refuge on this ship when expelled from Canton in 1922). This incident is well authenticated (recent accounts appear in O.M.Green's The Story of China's Revolution (1945), p.98, and S.I. Hsiung's The Life of Chiang Kai-shek (pp.242-244)), though it is not mentioned, so far as I know, in any published Russian source. But it is unlikely that the Russian advisers would have supported the coup without some party encouragement from Moscow; and many high members of the Russian party are known to have been opposed from the outset to the alliance with Kuomintang. That the question must have been discussed at this time in the Politburo seems certain, though the decision taken was evidently to gloss over the incident and continue the policy of support

for Chiang Kai-shek. The substance of the record here presented, if not emanating from Litvinov, must have come from someone closely concerned in the affair, even if Mao's alleged presence and a few other details represent later accretions. It is, for example, unlikely that a recent forger or fiction-writer would have made Litvinov speak enthusiastically of Chiang Kai-shek, though this attitude was natural enough in 1926 or even in the middle 1930's.

The third theme is Germany. The journal represents Litvinov as considering the secret armaments agreement with Germany at the time of the Rapallo treaty as 'a mistake and a big one'; there seems to be no evidence of Litvinov's disapproval at the time, though it is well known that he took an anti-German line in the 1930's. But the sensational item comes at a later point in the journal. Throughout 1928 the German campaign to secure the evacuation of the Rhineland was in full swing. The decision to set up an allied committee on reparations (the Young Committee) was taken in September 1928; and a detailed agreement on the composition and functions of the committee had been reached before the end of the year (the committee actually met in February 1929). The Soviet leaders, rightly foreseeing that an agreement on reparations was in sight, and that this might well lead to the evacuation of the Rhineland, were acutely

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disturbed by the fear, intermittently present in their minds ever since Locarno, of a combination between Germany and the West against them. In December 1928, according to the Litvinov journal, Stalin undertook a desperate and ingenious countermove to avert this danger. The strongest supporters of a Soviet orientation in German foreign policy were believed in Moscow to be the German General Staff, formerly headed by von Seeckt (the real author on the German side of the secret military agreements) and now by von Hammerstein. It was to these circles that Stalin now turned. He instructed the Soviet military leaders - Tuchachevsky, Yakir and Kork are named in this connection - to let their German opposite numbers know that they would be prepared to co-operate with them against Communists and, at some time in the future, set up a military dictatorship in Russia which would offer Germany an unlimited market. Such a turn of events would be obviously in the German interest, whereas the overthrow of the Soviet Government by a hostile combination from outside would only have the result of setting up in its place a government under the patronage of Great Britain and France. This manoeuvre was designed to induce the German General Staff to prevent Stresemann from entering into a bloc with the Western Powers against Soviet Russia; and it was believed to have succeeded in its purpose.

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The interesting points about this strange story are two. In the first place, if true, it would provide striking evidence of the extreme fear of a German-Western combination against Soviet Russia dominating Soviet policy in Europe in the period between the two wars, though there appears to have been no time when such a combination was within the bounds of practical politics: it certainly was not in 1928 and 1929. Secondly, the story, if true, would throw a fresh light on the execution of the generals in 1937. Just as Krestinsky was condemned for dealings with the German Government which he had carried out on instructions from the Politburo, but which were represented at the trial as part of a 'Trotskyite' conspiracy, so - on this hypothesis - the treasonable acts for which the generals were executed had in fact been committed by them, but committed on Stalin's secret orders. The story cannot at present be accepted simply on the evidence of the present document. But it can be added to the vast mass of speculations about the great purges of the nineteen-thirties and is by no means the least plausible of them.

Enough has been said to show that this document was, in spite of its speculative character, well worth publishing; and, though it contains passages which are certainly spurious, it was right to publish it in its entirety in

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order to give the critical reader the opportunity of judging it as a whole. It is impossible for the historian in the present state of our knowledge to use it unconditionally as evidence of facts. But, handled with caution, it still makes a useful contribution to our understanding of the conditions in which Soviet policy was framed and conducted in these years and of the attitude of those concerned.

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.....длинный континентальный разговор....Теперь я все зна-
 лал...Несколько дней спустя действующее через Канделарию...В
 советники будет назначен Астахов...Судя по всему, как сейчас
 и направят в Париж послан...Все инструкции Канделарии прино-
 сят прямо из секретариата Ц.К. специальным курьером.....
Полное объяснение истории с фотографией
Возмущен тем, что все это происходит за моей спиной....
 Если хотят ставить одновременно на двух лошадей, пусть ста-
 вят, но не же не.....
(пропуск)...Не понимаю также, на какой базе
 может быть соглашение...Гитлер скорее пойдет за Лондоном...
Решил поговорить с.....Молотов не
 хотел ставить точку на "и"...Отрицает все....Хотел узнать,
 почему я обеспокоен...Кто мог.....Я, конечно, скрыл источ-
 ник.Сказал, что пошел из немецкого Вулленбурга...Молотов был
 смущен...Он поверил моей хитрости...Очевидно беспокоился,
 что вся эта интрига может быть случайно провалена...Хотел
 чтобы я устроил завтра и пригласил его в Вулленбург.Я на-
 категорически отказал.Сказал, что невозможно утихнуть от дикоросу-
 са...Пойдут толки о завтрашней встрече притворства с немецким
 послан...Он пошел и отказался.Сказал, что.....
(пропуск).....
Читал письмо Ринг Хейс.....
В феврале...Вчера имел длинный разговор с новым
 американским послан...Он пошел из немецкого Вулленбурга...
 Все время говорил, что крайне важно то, что он говорил, и
 что то так отмечал.....Я пытался ему объяснить, что

Соединенные Штаты также нуждаются в том, чтобы была создана система коллективной безопасности... Он уперся и говорил, что нет никакой надобности... Когда я ему указал на опасность со стороны Японии, он вдруг заявил: "Японии мы не боимся, так как между ней и нами имеется океан и Скалистые Горы, которые защищают Соединенные Штаты от вторжения с запада..." Я покал плечами и прочитал этому удивительному дипломату лекцию о планах Японии в Тихом Океане... Указав ему, что японцы не имеют никакого намерения перобрасываться через Беринг или Персик Робсона, или через вершину Мак-Кинлей в Аляске, но что они могут попытаться захватить острова в Тихом Океане и Индонезии... Этого им будет вполне достаточно.....

.....Говорили о моем пребывании в Лондоне в декабре прошлого года..... Дэвис много распространялся о международной торговле... Попытался поговорить о процессе Радека и Пятакова... Я уклонился, имея в виду, что он уже надоел с этим вопросом Нейману несколько дней тому назад.....

.....Возговор с Гельсингфорса..... Он приехал сообщить нам, что Финляндия решила соблюдать самый строгий нейтралитет между нами и Германией и что Гельсингфорс склонен войти в Скандинавский нейтральный блок.....

...Разговор с Кулондром... Страшно интересуется вопросом о коминтерне.... Не понимаю почему: во Франции компартия действует легально и никакой опасности по существу не представляет.....

.....(прерыв)... Неожиданно был вызван и генералу.....

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...Очевидно Молотов сообщил ему о нашем разговоре... Емь обязательно любил, как о нем бывало, когда он казался обворехить кого либо... Случая его я невольно вспоминаю, как он беспокоился о здоровье Пятакова в 1931 году, во время болезни... Прислал ему маж... А теперь спокойно послал по расправу и Емю... Он начал с того, что хотел бы объяснить мне его точку зрения на наше дипломатическое маневрирование. Говорил о том, что мы - угрожаемая сторона и что поэтому не имеем права становиться на одну какую либо исключительную позицию.... "Я полностью одобряю одобряю вашу идею о коллективной безопасности... С тех пор, как мы приняли эту идею в Политбюро, ничего не изменилось... Но мы должны сознаваться, что реально у нас пока ничего не вышло... Это почти до этого времени не.....".....сказав:" не забывайте одного; amici к безопасности в Европе у Лондона. А amici Лондона находятся теперь у Рузвельта... Сколько бы Чемберлен, Галифакс и компания не жили на старости о Гитлером, последнее слово скажет Рузвельт... Поэтому, наряду с вашей работой по коллективной безопасности, не забывайте работать по плану советскому Рузвельта в русло нашей политики... Я люблю делать комплименты, но могу сказать, что мы, как- единственные, кто может полностью завоевать Рузвельта... Дав вам полную свободу действий в этом направлении..." Я задал тогда ему вопрос с Кандолами.. Он улыбнулся : "Кандолами-ной старый приятель по подпольной работе из Канзаса... Его кличка была - "Лже" ...За него не беспокой-

тось, если никто не сможет понять в западном".....

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..Зная, что он любит поговорки я сказал : "согласен, что Канке-
 лики-лики, но все же - один ум коромо, а два - тучи..." Он рассме-
 ялся : "правильно... Кас и смеется для ума, - я и Канделяки....
 Не беспокойтесь... Я обиднее себя не дам..." Прибавил:
 во всяком случае, если вы действительно серьезно и ответственно
 разговариваете, то составьте мне курс... Пока что мы им являем-
 ся марионетками... Это придает им опора и упорства, чтобы не
 уступать и борется противники Лондона и соглашения на нем
 отчет....".....
(пропуск).....
Знаю Клейбера... Рассказывал о последних художествах
 соседа о руганском походе... Он-любитель багетов... Ему
 создали настоящие гарем... Поставили микрофон в спальню....
 Сказываются Клейбер включает микрофон, чтобы проверить работу
 своих сотрудниц... Тоска берет, как вроду, во время разгово-
 ра с этими багетками... Начальник НКВД слушает... Пока
 это-единственный случай сотрудничества НКВД с капитали-
 стическим миром.....
Чел у меня есть... Гляди сюда "человек и....
(пропуск).....
Длинный разговор с де Талле... Вечер закончился с
 просьбами о.....
Приглашен на ужин в Золотую... Длинный разговор...
 Сказал ему, что такое о нейтралитете будет странным сим-
 вол и задол на маленькую Гитлера.....

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.....Идею Туленбурга... Гитлер у него узнать..... Безпо-
лезно. Нем, как рыба, яли имеет инструкции.....
.....Молодой тов. онирок... Может видеть рисунковского
подла... Просит, чтобы я тоже присутствовал... Я начал было
отказываться: приходится играть роль переводчика... Не по чи-
ну все же... Пришлось согласиться... Предупредил, что возьму с
собой Немана для перевода.....
.....(присел).....
.....Узнал совершенно точно, что скоро предстоит арест монт
заместителей... Это я начал думать... Не знаю, как
мне поступить... Предупредить их... Безполезно.....
.....Тому снова решил ответить не сразу... Буду
ждать каждую чашу надежды, что примитив американцев и англичан...
...Странная все же краля... После Эммерлонович просил меня
по теле оку не обижаться на эту мою Эколу... Скавал, что так
надо и что моей кою будет спокойнее..... Что породило
ли, что Эколу застрелил в эском кабинете несколько человек на
автоматического маршала... Настоящие бойни, а не ИКВ...
Законский камп у Эколы.....
.....Глазти полны гор, от Эколы... Имеет уже чин:
главный печальник сов. сов. переводки... Сказывают ого
во все... Я думаю... Арестовал почти всех сотрудников "Правды"
и "Ленин" вместе с "Харитом".....
.....(присел)... Обед... Итальянского повар... Простые рас-
говоры... Сказывают, что... Не и так точно от моего

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собственного славословия....При том же нельзя сравнить дуче с
 нашим гениальным вождем..Дело не в личных способностях и та-
 лантах, а в том, в какой стране действует этот самый вождь...
 Россия не Италия...Все, что происходит у нас, имеет немедленно
 мировой резонанс...А Италия, это-.....
(пропуск).....
Дальние соседи прислали интересную докладную записку.
 Этова этот японский генерал Тада.....Речь идет не более и не
 менее, как о захвате всего северного Китая.....
 ...Как полкравд в Токио сообщает содержание своей беседы с....
Японцы определенно решили захватить Китай...Что насчет-
 ся Монголии, то имеется у них две точки зрения.Одна.....
Надо ожидать больших трудностей в.....
Соседи закулись на Дранти.Утверждают, что он занимается
 совершенно откровенным шпионажем...Все время интересуется
 нашей добычей золота...Пробовал подкупить каких-то сотрудников
 нас..... Вовсе, как бы они его не арестовали...Звонил я...
Молотов обещал позвонить Клеву...Вообще я просил, чтобы
 все вопросы, касающиеся американских журналистов, обязательно
 проходили через меня.....Звонил мне Гановский...
 Я удивился....Он сказал, чтобы я больше не беспокоился за Др-
 ранти: "им его ценят, ставят на полном блаженном картоне...
 Подкупили ему такую сумму о нашей добыче золота, что.....
 Он теперь будет всем сообщать, что у нас золота больше, чем...
"(пропуск).....

STATOTHR

Dear Bob,

I apparently can't escape from Russia even on vacation, and something has just come up which I thought might interest you. A publisher has asked me to give him an opinion on the advisability of publishing a manuscript which is alleged to be a secret journal kept or dictated by Litvinov for two decades after 1926. A British publisher is going to bring it out - supported by an opinion from E.H. Carr - and at least two American publishers have turned it down. There is some considerable secrecy about the manuscript's origin, but Madame Kollontai is supposed to have been involved.

I haven't read it yet, but hope to during the next week. However since the manuscript claims to tell in detail about how policy was made under Stalin, relations of L to Molotov and others now living, details about Mao Tse-tung's role as early as 1926 etc. I thought you might be interested. If so I should be glad to have one of your people look it over here, though if that happens I should want that fact - as also this letter - to be classified since I haven't told the publisher of this. I realize on the other hand that you may already have seen this manuscript and have some idea of its credibility or lack thereof. Since I can't keep the manuscript too long, I wish you would let me know as soon as possible if your people are interested.

The Alsop's column today amused me in a wry fashion because I had long been wondering when one of my more courageous journalistic colleagues would point out what I had realized, that the Oppenheimer hearing transcript is the greatest intelligence gift to the Russians since the Smythe Report. If George Kennan ever gets another diplomatic job, the Russians will undoubtedly trot out his statement that he had had an intelligence connection. Why that and other key things were left in escapes me completely. I thought they believed in security in your town.

Hope the Washington heat hasn't been too oppressive.

Cordially

STATOTHR

PS - Did you get my letter on the Chinese matter last week and the enclosures. I haven't had any reply from you.

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